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Vaccine Innovation and Adoption: Polio Vaccines
in the UK, the Netherlands and West Germany,
1955–1965
ULRIKE LINDNER and STUART S BLUME*
Introduction: Vaccine Innovation
‘‘AneffectiveAIDSvaccinecouldbefoundasearlyas2012,saving6millionlivesifthe
world iswilling toput£10bnayearintoanew programme,the chancellor,GordonBrown,
said in a speech last night in Tanzania’’.
1 Faith in biomedical science; the conviction that
new vaccines will be translated into lives saved; belief in the necessity of globally con-
certed action: the British minister’s statement reflects views of vaccine innovation that are
widely held today. New and improved vaccines seem our best hope of coping with the
scourge of AIDS, of arming ourselves against the unknown threats of emergent diseases
and potential bioterrorism, and oftacklingthe resurgenceof old diseases arising once more
in Europe. Global coordination, pooling our resources, seems self-evidently necessary,
given the international nature of a modern epidemic. Much current discussion of vaccine
development and use thus has a global character. That is to say, it is conducted under the
banner of global slogans
2 or it seeks to establish globally integrated approaches to vaccine
research and development (R&D).
3 Over the past two decades the development and rapid
introduction of new vaccines have come to dominate the vaccine agenda worldwide.
4
Socialscientists and health policy analysts have been set to work, examining barriersto the
implementation of international priorities at the national level. Why, for example, are
national responses to the availability of new vaccines often so lethargic? A recent study of
the adoption of Hemophilus influenza b (Hib) conjugate vaccine is a good example.
5 It
shows policy makers in four countries rationally weighing the burden to public health of
the diseases against which the vaccine offers protection (bacterial meningitis and
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425pneumonia), against the high cost of the vaccine. Health policy analysts tend to explain the
decision to introduce a new vaccine, or to replace an existing vaccine by a new alternative,
in terms of the epidemiology and seriousness of the disease, and of scientific consensus
regarding the efficacy and potential risks of the vaccine and (perhaps) their costs. The
studies of vaccine diffusion and adoption that they conduct have little or nothing to say
about political disagreements, or the influence of commercial interests, national traditions,
international relations, or global agendas. Where any attention is paid to vaccine history, it
is generally in the attempt to illustrate factors (such as resistance to vaccination) that might
cause deviations from the rational deployment of vaccines.
6
Do—and more importantly can—scientific and epidemiological data determine vaccine
policy in the way assumed by most contemporary policy analysis? The very different idea
that, far from being determinant, scientific, epidemiological and economic data are subject
to construction and reconstruction by political actors, has been central to recent historical
analysis. When a hepatitis B vaccine was licensed for use in the UK in 1982, DHSS guide-
lines issuedsoonafterwardsdrewattentiontoitslimitedavailability,highcost, andthelow
rate of occurrence of the disease.
7 Jennifer Stanton has analysed the debate to which these
restrictive recommendations then led, and which continued intermittently into the 1990s.
The debate focused on fears regarding the safety of the vaccine (produced from carrier
blood plasma) and on the groups to which vaccine should be offered. The pharmaceutical
company marketing the vaccine in the UK participated actively in the debate. So did
segments of the medical profession, in ways that often reflected differing perceptions of
their being at risk. ‘‘Although vaccine policy was set by the Department of Health,’’ she
concludes, ‘‘...it was implemented by regional health authorities. As with other historical
examples, the delegation of final responsibility for decisions about who should receive the
vaccine, from the centre to the peripheries, acted as a very effective brake on the wider
uptake of the vaccine. At every level, advice was sought ...from medical experts ...but
(again with historical parallels) this medical opinion was often divided and unable to push
very strongly in one direction’’.
8 Subsequently, changes in the law affecting the liability of
health authorities as employers, the availability of a new recombinant vaccine, and advo-
cacy by international health bodies, all played their part in a gradual evolution in thinking
and in policy.
Comparative historical analysis of national responses to the development of a new
vaccine can serve to highlight influences or assumptions that might otherwise be invisible,
because unarticulated. It can also help us understand better how scientific and epidemio-
logical data are differently construed. Linda Bryder’s analysis of responses to the devel-
opment of BCG (Bacillus Calmette-Gue ´rin) vaccine, in the early 1920s, is exemplary in
this respect.
9 Whilst Scandinavian countries rapidly introduced BCG vaccination in the
6AMSternandHMarkel,‘Thehistoryofvaccines
and immunization: familiar patterns, new challenges’,
Health Affairs, 2005, 24: 611–21.
7JStanton,‘Whatshapesvaccinepolicy?Thecase
of hepatitis B in the UK’, Soc. Hist. Med., 1994, 7:
427–46.
8Ibid., p. 444.
9L Bryder, ‘‘‘We shall not find salvation in
inoculation’’: BCG vaccination in Scandinavia,
Britain and the USA, 1921–1960’, Soc. Sci. Med.,
1999, 49: 1157–67; see also C Bonah, ‘‘‘As safe as
milk or sugar water’’: perceptions of the risks and
benefitsof theBDG vaccinein the 1920sand 1930sin
France and Germany’, in T Schlich and U Tro ¨hler
(eds), The risks of medicalinnovation:risk perception
and assessment in historical context, Abingdon and
New York, Routledge, 2006, pp. 71–92.
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Ulrike Lindner and Stuart S Blumeattempt to combat tuberculosis, Britain introduced it only in 1950, whilst in the USA the
vaccine was scarcely used. ‘‘All three countries claimed their policies were rooted in
scientific research; if so, why did the interpretation of the same research, together with
somelocallyconductedresearch,yieldsuchdifferentresults?’’asksBryder.
10InDenmark,
Norway and Sweden, local studies, as well as the convictions of influential physicians, led
to growing use of BCG through the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s. Despite the fact that no
randomized controlled trials were conducted in Scandinavia, the vaccine came to be
accepted as a major protective weapon against tuberculosis. By contrast, British scientists
remained sceptical. Evidence from Scandinavia was seen as non-conclusive, given that no
randomized trials had been conducted. Scientific doubts and objections were accompanied
by, and have to be seen in the context of, other convictions that played an important role.
Most important, argues Bryder, was the conviction that Britain already had an effective
system of tuberculosis control with which vaccination would only interfere. Specialized
sanatoria were central to this system, as was an ‘‘ideology of self-responsibility and self-
control’’. The objective should not be to provide a false sense of security through vaccina-
tion, but to encourage healthy and responsible life-styles. It was only after the Second
World War, with the coming of the National Health Service and its new commitment to
greater equality in health care provisions, and an administrative (and manpower) crisis in
the residential institutions, that BCG came to be widely accepted. In the USA too, the
safety and efficacy of the vaccine were initially doubted, and there was a similar fear that
mass vaccination would interfere with existing approaches to tuberculosis control. By the
1950s, despite (or because of) endorsement of BCG in Britain, debate in the USA had
become all the fiercer. Central to professional opposition, argues Bryder, was the commit-
ment of American specialists to existing, curative, approaches. Tuberculosis specialists
were unwilling to be convinced by any evidence for the effectiveness of mass vaccination
andwere not,asinBritain,challengedeitherbyinstitutionalcrisisoramajorshift inpublic
health ideology. Not so much the scientific evidence, always open to differing interpreta-
tions, as differences in social welfare traditions and systems seem to explain these major
national differences.
Taken together, these two careful historical accounts of vaccine introduction point in a
direction very different from that of today’s health policy analyses. Both Stanton and
Bryder emphasize the non-determinant character of scientific and medical data: data that
arealmostinevitablysubjecttoalternativeinterpretations.Theydrawourattention,first,to
the structure of health care systems. Decentralization of responsibility to the British health
care regions acted as a brake on the introduction of the hepatitis B vaccine. They draw our
attention, second, to the importance of existing welfare traditions and professional com-
mitments. These suggestions form the starting point for the analysis offered here.
It is important to note that each of these interpretations of vaccine innovation and
diffusion has been theorized and used empirically by other authors, most relevantly in
studies of medical innovation. For example, in their study of forms and consequences of
state intervention in health care (which compares Britain, France, Sweden and the United
States over the period 1890–1970) Rogers Hollingsworth and his co-authors devote a
chapter to a comparison of the adoption and diffusion of medical technologies in these
10Bryder, op. cit., note 9 above, p. 1157.
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Polio Vaccine Innovation and Adoptioncountries. They seek to understand howthe structure of a deliverysystem,and its degree of
state control and finance, influences the adoption and spread of medical innovations.
11
Looking specifically at smallpox vaccine in the nineteenth century, they conclude that the
‘‘degree of state intervention ... precisely matches the progression in the diffusion of
smallpox vaccine ...its impact outweighs sharp differences in social development, pro-
fessionalization, and specialization’’.
12 This conclusion can be seen as a generalization of
Stanton’s point regarding the significance of decentralization.
The notion of path dependency tries to capture the influence of prior commitments and
traditions of the kind emphasized by Bryder. Looking at a number of examples of innova-
tions in health care in the United States, the historian David Rothman has stressed the
influence of national characteristics and institutions.
13 Rothman uses the term path depen-
dency to characterize the iteration between institutions and choices. Quoting Robert
Putnam, he writes, ‘‘What comes first ...conditions what comes later. Individuals may
‘choose’ their institutions, but they do not choose them under circumstances of their own
making, and their choices in turn influence the rules within which their successors
choose’’.
14Focusingonsuccessionsoftechnologiesmoregenerally,anumberofeconomic
historians and historians of technology have also tried to theorize the ways in which expe-
rience in using a technology shapes attempts at its improvement, whilst excluding alter-
native technological approaches. The concept of ‘‘lock in’’, applied most famously by Paul
David to explain persistence of the QWERTY typewriter keyboard,
15 is closely related to
that of path dependency and has proved very fruitful in the study of technological change.
Our focus in this paper is on the introduction of vaccines against poliomyelitis in the
Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), Great Britain and the Netherlands. Public
healthauthoritiesinthethreecountriesrespondedverydifferentlytotheemergenceofboth
the Salk polio vaccine (IPV) in the mid-1950s and the Sabin polio vaccine (OPV) a few
yearslater.Intryingtounderstandhowandwhythiswasso,
16wewillfocusinparticularon
the relevance (and the adequacy) of the themes we have drawn from the studies by Stanton
andbyBryder.Wewillalsomakeuseoftheoretical approaches,suchasthosenotedabove,
used by sociologists and economists in the analysis of innovation processes.
Development and Introduction of the ‘‘Killed Virus’’
Polio Vaccine 1952–1960
The early years of polio vaccine development were characterized not only by personal
animosity between two of the principal actors (Salk and Sabin) but also by widespread
disagreement among experts regarding the relative merits of a ‘‘killed’’ or ‘‘inactivated’’
virus vaccine and a ‘‘weakened’’ or ‘‘attenuated’’ one. Jonas Salk, at the University
11J Rogers Hollingsworth, J Hage and R A
Hanneman, State intervention in medical care:
consequences for Britain, France, Sweden and the
United States, 1890–1970, Ithaca and London,
Cornell University Press, 1990.
12Ibid., p. 122.
13D J Rothman, Beginnings count: the
technological imperative in American health care,
New York, Oxford University Press, 1997.
14Ibid., p. 13.
15P A David, ‘Clio and the economics of
QWERTY’, Am. Econ. Rev., 1985, 75, Papers and
proceedings, pp. 332–7.
16Historical studies of polio vaccines have
tended to focus on the United States, where the
vaccines were developed. Little attention
has been paid to their introduction and use
in Europe.
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Ulrike Lindner and Stuart S Blumeof Pittsburgh, chose to try to develop an inactivated virus vaccine. The more common view
was that such a vaccine would not be adequate: that it would provide only a few months’
protection. Nevertheless, with supportfrom the National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis
(later the March of Dimes) Salk pushed ahead. By late 1952 it was decided that the Salk
vaccine was ready for a large-scale trial, and in April 1954 the US Public Health Service
approved the trial. In April 1955, surrounded by cameras, hordes of reporters, and flood-
lights, the director of the trial, epidemiologist Thomas Francis, presented the results. The
conclusion was that the vaccine was over 90 per cent effective against Types II and III, and
60 to 70 per cent effective against Type I polio virus. Whatever the proponents of an
attenuated vaccine might have thought, the American nation breathed a sigh of relief.
Within two hours the Salk vaccine was licensed for use. In 1955 five million American
children would have to be vaccinated.
Immediately,discussionofthedesirabilityofpoliovaccinationbeganinmanycountries.
In Denmark, which had been shaken by an epidemic of unprecedented severity in 1952,
action was rapid. Experts from the Danish State Serum Institute had already been in touch
with Salk and the Institute quickly set about vaccine production. Other European countries
moved more cautiously. A serious set-back was the so-called Cutter incident that occurred
shortly after the start of vaccination in the USA. Several children had become paralysed
as a result, it was concluded, of vaccine produced by one of the US manufacturers,
the Cutter company. The US Surgeon-General decided to take the Cutter vaccine off
the market. However, even after close examination of the Cutter procedures it was not
immediately clear what had caused the accident. Only later was it discovered that the
problem was a technical one associated with the filtration process. In May 1955 the US
vaccination programme was briefly suspended because of the accident. Public faith in the
Salk vaccine was severely shaken. However, after a short delay, vaccination was resumed
intheUnitedStates,andafterthefirstyeartheUSvaccinationprogrammewasseenasabig
success.
IPV in the Netherlands
The Dutch Health Council (Gezondheidsraad) immediately established a ‘‘Polio com-
mittee’’ to advise on the relevance for the Netherlands of the newly available vaccine. It
met for the first time in May 1955. In reports produced in June 1955 and May 1956 the
committee expressed doubts as to the adequacy of the Salk vaccine. Adequate immunity,
they advised, could be provided only by a vaccine containing live (attenuated) virus.
Moreover, in the US children of seven to eight years of age were being vaccinated, whilst
in the Netherlands children of five years and younger were eligible for vaccination. The
Minister of Health was advised not to permit import of the vaccine for routine use: advice
which he followed. However, in 1956 the country experienced a serious polio epidemic:
2,206 cases were recorded, of which 1,784 were paralytic. That fact, combined with the
clear evidence of what had been achieved in the USA, led to a change of heart in the
committee. By December it had decided that mass vaccination, on a voluntary basis and
under the auspices of and at the cost of the government, was necessary. In the same month
(December 1956) the Dutch Minister of Health announced that import of polio vaccine
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17 and free vaccination against polio offered to all children up to
fourteen years of age.
The Minister invited the Health Inspectorate to develop a plan for national polio vac-
cination, in collaboration with the Association of Local Authorities in the Netherlands, and
anumberofotherorganizations.Establishingcollaborationbetweenlocalauthorities,local
health services and doctors in the form of regional vaccination authorities (entadminis-
traties), under the supervision of the national Health Inspectorates, would ensure standard
practices, schedules and monitoring across the country. It is important that the Netherlands
already had a well-established vaccination system. Since 1953 Dutch children had been
offered vaccination against diphtheria, tetanus and whooping cough, without charge.
Implementation, however, was in the hands of a wide variety of organizations, differing
significantly from one area of the country to another. Central coordination and surveil-
lance, previously weak, were strengthened with the establishmentof a national vaccination
programme under the Ministry of Health in 1957. All children were to be given DKT (a
combination of vaccines against the bacterial infections diphtheria, pertussis and tetanus),
and—separately—theSalkpoliovaccine.Vaccinationswerefreeand,outofrespectforthe
objections of Orthodox Protestant groups to vaccination,
18 non-compulsory. Responsibil-
ity for the actual vaccinations was in the hands of the child welfare clinics, and supervised
by the regional vaccination authorities.
When theNetherlandsstarteditsnationalvaccinationprogrammein1957,thecombined
vaccine against diphtheria, pertussis and tetanus (DPT, in Dutch DKT) was produced by a
stateinstitute,theRijksinstituutvoorVolksgezondheid(RIV),thatalreadyhadconsiderable
experience in the production of bacterial vaccines. Production of DKT on the scale needed
had posed technical problems that could not be solved with the skills available in the
Institute. Investments in new technology, and in personnel to develop it, had already been
made. Although initial supplies of polio vaccine had been purchased abroad, in 1957 the
government decided that the country should produce the vaccine itself. The RIV imme-
diately set towork,preparing toestablisha polio vaccine laboratory. Using new processing
technology that it had developed itself, within a relatively short time RIV had an efficient
andeffectivesystemfortheproductionofpoliovirus.Bycombiningthe poliovaccine with
the DKT, thought Hans Cohen (head of vaccine production at RIV, and later director of the
Institute), it ought to be possible to increase vaccination coverage, since only four injec-
tions would be required in place of the previous seven or eight (four times DKT plus three
or four times IPV). Thus, a start was made, in parallel, with development of a combination
DKTP vaccine. By the end of 1958 sufficient combination DKTP vaccine had been
produced for a trial to be held in the city of Leeuwarden.
19 By 1960, 1.1 million doses
17It was decided that vaccine would not be
imported from the USA, because the standards that
IPVwasrequiredtomeetinthatcountrywerefelttobe
inadequate and manufacturers had their hands full
meeting domestic need (which could lead to problems
in supply). A Belgian producer was selected by the
RIV. See H Cohen and R Hofman, letter to the Editor,
Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Geneeskunde, 2002,
146: 2454.
18The basis of these religious objections, and
their effect on Dutch legislation relating to
vaccination, are described in detail in P F Maas,
Parlement & Polio, ’s-Gravenhage, SDU-uitgeverij,
1988, esp. pp. 35–51.
19We are gratefulto Dr R J F Burgmeijer, medical
director of the National Vaccination Programme, for
help with the facts contained in this paragraph.
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Ulrike Lindner and Stuart S Blumeof DKTP had been produced: sufficient for an annual cohort of babies. After further trials,
aimed at assessing negative reactions to the vaccine, had been conducted in 1961, the new
combination vaccine was ready to be introduced on a national scale. In 1962 the combined
vaccine replaced the separate DKT and IPV vaccines in the national vaccination pro-
gramme. It is important to note that this programme was very effective from its beginning.
By 1960, 87 per cent of children born between 1945 and 1957 had been vaccinated with
IPV. The number of reported cases of polio fell dramatically, from 203 in 1957 to around
10 in the years after 1965 (see Figures 1 and 2).
IPV in West Germany
The situation in Germany in the mid- to late 1950s was different in a number of vital
respects. For one thing, leading German health officials and scientists seemed to be quite
distrustful of US vaccine research in general, a scepticism which was reinforced after the
Cutter incident in late spring 1955. Highly unorthodox theories regarding polio were put
forward by authoritative spokesmen and received serious attention.
20 For example Franz
Redeker (director of the health department in the Ministry of the Interior) declared in
September 1955 that IPV-inoculated children would disseminate polio and therefore could
infect non-vaccinated children. He even said the danger of being infected by ‘‘wild’’ polio
would be no greater than the danger of being infected by vaccination.
21 No less unortho-
dox, Professor Georg Henneberg, a German immunologist and at that time head of the
Robert Koch Institute in Berlin, stated at a meeting of polio experts in 1956 that Germany
had a less aggressive polio virus than that in the United States. Germany therefore had no
Figure 1
Polio in the England/Wales, West Germany and the













































20G Henneberg, ‘Zum Problem der
Poliomyelitisschutzimpfung in Deutschland’, Der
o ¨ffentliche Gesundheitsdienst, 1956/57, 18: 181–7.
21Bundesarchiv Koblenz (BAK), B 142/22,
Vermerk, 30 Sept. 1955.
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Polio cases in the Netherlands per 100,000 population
a
Year 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955
Cases of
acute polio
3.8 7.3 0.8 1.6 0.8 5.7 16.3 1.6 0.7 4.5
Year 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965
Cases of
acute polio
20.4 1.9 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.7 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.02
Polio cases in West Germany per 100,000 population
b
Year 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955
Cases of
acute polio
2.1 7.0 11.2 3.5 5.7 2.5 18.7 4.5 5.2 5.4
Year 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965
Cases of
acute polio
7.8 4.2 2.9 3.8 7.4 8.3 0.5 0.4 0.1 0.08
Polio cases in England and Wales per 100,000 population
c
Year 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955
Cases of
acute polio
1.6 18.3 4.2 13.2 18.2 6.0 8.8 10.2 4.4 14.1
Year 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965
Cases of
acute polio
7.1 10.7 4.2 2.2 0.8 1.9 0.6 0.1 0.08 0.2
a R J F Burgmeijer and D J A Bolscher, Vaccinaties bij kinderen, 4th ed., Assen, Koninklijke
Van Gorcum, 2002; and Statistisch jaarboek for population numbers.
b Until 1960 numbers without West Berlin, from 1961 onwards with West Berlin. Statistik der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Gesundheitswesen, 1946–50, p. 18; 1951, p. 39; 1952, p. 51; 1953,
p. 34; 1954, p. 33; 1955, p. 33; 1956, p. 24; 1957, p. 22; 1958, p. 23; Statistisches Bundesamt,
Fachserie A: Bevo ¨lkerung und Kultur, Reihe 7, Gesundheitswesen, 1960, p. 41; 1962, p. 27; 1964,
p. 52; 1970, p. 78; and Statistisches Bundesamt, Statistisches Jahrbuch for population numbers.
c The table includes the numbers of polio cases in England and Wales; Scotland is not included.
Reports of the Chief Medical Officer on the state of the public health, 1947, PP 1948–49, XVI,
p. 40; 1951, PP 1952–53, XIII, p. 40; 1957, PP 1958–59, XV, p. 52; 1961, PP 1962–63, XIX, p. 44;
Gesundheitswesen, 1970, p. 78 and Annual Abstract of Statistics for population numbers.
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Ulrike Lindner and Stuart S Blumeneed of mass vaccination. It would be more advisable to wait for a ‘‘natural immunity’’
against polio, which would develop in due course. Lacking any data or evidence to support
this view, he nevertheless discussed his theories openly at a conference with Thomas
Francis, who had been responsible for the IPV trials in the USA.
22 Whilst there were other
German scientists who supported a quick IPV vaccination programme, these strongly
sceptical views prevailed at the highest level.
23 At the same time, the public discourse
remained muted: a stronginterest inthe new IPV vaccinationdid not develop; there was no
significant pressure from the public on health politicians to introduce the new vaccine.
Equally, when vaccination was finally introduced in 1958, the response of the public was
not enthusiastic.
24
From 1957 onwards, however, a slight change can be observed in the attitudes of
scientists and health politicians: several German scientists now reported regularly at
the International and European Polio Conferences.
25 Their concern about the poor
West German position in the international fight against polio grew; at the same time,
their mistrust of the new vaccines gradually faded in the face of the successful introduction
of these in other European countries. Also, the peculiar theories about immunization
processes were no longer mentioned.
26
However, whereas the Netherlands was rapidly developing a tightly integrated and
centrally organized vaccination programme, Germany had a loosely organized and patchy
one. After the Second Word War, the German public health system was de-centralized and
organized at the L€ a ander (individual state) level. The health authorities never succeeded in
rebuilding the strong health service that had existed in the years of the Weimar Republic.
27
In the 1950s, West Germany had no Ministry of Health at the federal level, only a
department within the Ministry of the Interior, and most public health issues were
dealt with at the level of the individual states. This meant that vaccination was under
the control of the individual L€ a ander and their ministries: they had to license vaccines, to
import vaccines, to issue laws or decrees on how to deal with vaccination. Coordinating
institutions existed, to be sure. These included the Bundesgesundheitsrat, a federal
22BAK, B 142/22, Protokoll Wiesbadner
Symposium der ‘Ventnor-Foundation’, 2 June 1956;
see also ‘Robert-Koch-Institut – Tradition und
Fortschritt’,EpidemiologischesBulletin,2000,no.39,
pp. 311–18.
23There was a widespread scientific discourse on
polio therapy in West Germany, but almost no
publications on polio vaccines, since research in the
FRG on vaccination was negligible. Der o ¨ffentliche
Gesundheitsdienst, the official journal of the German
Association for the Fight against Polio, had only one
original article on virological issues before 1960, see
also details in R Wohlrab, ‘Praktische Anwendung
neuester virologischer Untersuchungen’, Der
o ¨ffentliche Gesundheitsdienst, 1959/60, 21: 558–74.
Thereforethescientificdiscourseonpoliovaccination
wasdominatedbyonlyafewpeoplesuchasthehealth
politician Franz Redeker and the immunologistGeorg
Henneberg.
24BAK, B 142/23, Referat Dr Lundt € u uber die
ImpfungengegenPoliomyelitisinderBundesrepublik
Deutschland, Sept. 1958.
25For the change in attitudes, see, for example,
reports of German delegates at the European
Poliomyelitis-Symposiumsin1958and1960:BAK,B
142/23, Bericht Poliomyelitis-Symposium Madrid f€ u ur
das Innenministerium, 1958; Vorarchiv
Arbeitsministerium NRW, 1200, Sitzung, 7 April
1960.
26For the more positive attitude in West German
ministries and councils in 1957/58, see Vorarchiv
Arbeitsministerium NRW, 1200, Konferenz der f€ u ur
das Gesundheitswesen zust€ a andigen Minister und
Senatoren Berlin, 1 March 1957; BAK, B 142/23
Vermerk, 5 Sept. 1959.
27L v. Manger-Koenig, ‘Der o ¨ffentliche
Gesundheitsdienst zwischen Gestern und Morgen’,
Das o ¨ffentliche Gesundheitswesen, 1975, 37: 433–8.
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Polio Vaccine Innovation and Adoptioncommittee for public health, and a committee of L€ a ander health ministers. However, even if
the minister and leading medical officers of the L€ a ander met regularly at national level, it
was still very difficult to organize a co-ordinated public health service.
28 As an outcome of
these problems, IPV vaccination was introduced unevenly. Most of the L€ a ander (including
Bavaria) charged fees, whilst a few (including North-Rhine-Westphalia) gave out vaccine
for free. No coherent official programme regarding vaccination had been developed and
there was no national campaign designed to encourage it. Nor was there any powerful
pressure groupsupportingvaccination.TheGermanAssociationfortheFightagainstPolio
(Deutsche Vereinigung zur Bek€ a ampfung der Kinderl€ a ahmung) acted quite cautiously and
was not dominated by patients but by the same health officials and scientists who took the
decisions at the L€ a ander and federal levels.
29 In contrast to the National Vaccination
Programme in the Netherlands, the weak, de-centralized and disorganized German health
system seemed ill-equipped to carry out a complicated vaccination process.
A third difference concerned vaccine production. Whereas in the Netherlands IPV was
produced by a state institute, RIV, which functioned under the responsibility of the
Ministry of Health, vaccine in Germany was produced by a private company, Behring-
werke (part of Hoechst AG), located in Marburg.
30 Relations between the sole manufac-
turer of IPV in Germany and public health authorities proved to be difficult. The first
German Land, Hesse, where Behringwerke was located, had approved the production
for vaccination very early and had allowed vaccination in some children’s hospitals in
spring1955.However,vaccinationwasstoppedagainsoonafterwards.
31InApril1955,the
members of the Bundesgesundheitsamt, the central federal office for research in medicine/
public health, were not permitted to enter the company’s production laboratory. Behring-
werke accused themofindustrialespionage. Thisbehaviourresultedingrowingmistrustin
the health administrationatbothL€ a ander andfederallevelsandwas onereasonforthe rapid
termination of vaccination in Hesse. Other events added to the strained relationship
between the two, which also furthered the slow introduction of IPV in West Germany.
From 1958 onwards, however, Behringwerke was producing sufficient IPV for German
requirements and the relationship between the health administration and the company
seemed to have improved.
To summarize: IPV was never successfully implemented in Germany and reached only
5 per cent of the population in 1960. Why was there no determined commitment to IPV in
Germany? The dominant view atthe time was that the public simply did notacceptthe IPV
vaccineandthatnothingcouldbedonebythestateandtheadministration.
32Inrealitythere
was a more complicated interplay of factors and tensions between user, state, market and
28BAK,B142/22,Protokoll€ u uberdieBesprechung
der leitenden Medizinalbeamten der L€ a ander, 10 Feb.
1956.
29U Lindner, Gesundheitspolitik in der
Nachkriegszeit. Großbritannien und die
Bundesrepublik Deutschland im Vergleich, Munich,
Oldenbourg, 2004, pp. 239–40.
30W Bartmann, Zwischen Tradition und
Fortschritt. Aus der Geschichte der Pharmabereiche
von Bayer, Ho ¨chst und Schering von 1935–1975,
Stuttgart, Franz Steiner, 2003.
31BAK,B142/22,Protokoll€ u uberdieBesprechung
mit den Leitenden Medizinalbeamten der L€ a ander, 10.
Feb. 1956; Die Schutzimpfung gegen Poliomyelitis,
Behringwerk-Mitteilungen, Heft 31, Marburg a.d.
Lahn, Elwert, 1956, p. 258.
32Statement of the Minister for Health, Dr
Elisabeth Schwarzhaupt, Verhandlungen des
DeutschenBundestages,4.Wahlperiode,26.Meeting,
12 April 1962, p. 1069.
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Ulrike Lindner and Stuart S Blumetechnology that made Germany react cautiously towards IPV, delaying its implementation
until 1957. Then, the L€ a ander developed their individual programmes to provide IPV
vaccine for citizens. Furthermore, the long discussions between 1955 and 1957 in the
scientific community, dominated by the alleged risks of IPV vaccination, did nothing to
increasepublictrustinthevaccine.By1958itwasbecomingclearthattheFRGwasfalling
behind other European countries in bringing polio under control. But even then, the
GermanstatedidnotimmediatelyintroducenewprogrammestospeedupIPVvaccination.
Accordingly, the number of polio cases remained high until 1961/62, when OPV was
eventually introduced (see Figure 1).
IPV in the UK
The British response to IPV was different again. Virological research on polio
and polio vaccines had been slow and weak during the 1940s and the beginning of the
1950s.
33 In contrast to West Germany, UK health officials were not mistrustful of
American research. On the contrary, they had high hopes of Salk’s IPV vaccine and
the planned US field trials in 1954. Sir Weldon Dalrymple-Champneys was sent by
the Ministry of Health for England and Wales to the United States in 1954 to attend
these trails. He returned enthusiastic about the possibilities of the new vaccine. The
Ministry of Health prepared vaccinations for spring 1955.
34 Children from Sheffield,
Manchester and London would be inoculated first and then tested for their serological
reaction.
In the UK there was no state institute to produce the vaccine as there was in the
Netherlands, but—as in West Germany—private producers worked together with the
health administration. However, since the main producer of vaccine in Britain, the phar-
maceutical company Glaxo, could not produce enough vaccine in time, the British trials
were delayed.
35
When some weeks later the Cutter incident in the USA became known, the British
vaccination project was stopped immediately. Some of those who had been enthusiastic
advocates, such as Dalrymple-Champneys, now became sceptical.
36 Both the Medical
Research Committee and the Joint Committee on Poliomyelitis Vaccine advised against
the importation of US-produced Salk-vaccine. In the UK, vaccine made from the virulent
Mahoney strain (as was the US Salk-vaccine) was forbidden. However, Glaxo could not
produce vaccine made from different virus strains in sufficient quantities so quickly. This
meant a further delay in the vaccination programme. There were no more vaccinations in
1955.
37 The Ministry of Health and especially the Medical Research Council moved
cautiously during the next two years, even though the Cutter incident had been cleared
33National Archives (NA), Public Record Office
(PRO),MH55/1769,InfantileParalysisFellowshipto
Minister of Health, 27 Sept. 1951.
34Wellcome Library, London, Archives and
Manuscripts, GC 139, F 22.
35Report of the Chief Medical Officer on the
state of the public health, 1955, PP 1956–57, XIII,
p. 77.
36‘Poliomyelitis vaccine trials deferred’, Br. med.
J., 1955, i: 1535; T Gould, A summer plague: polio
and its survivors, New Haven and London, Yale
University Press, 1995, p. 160.
37NA, PRO, MH 133/467, Joint Committee on
Poliomyelitis Vaccine, Meeting 13 July 1955; Joint
CommitteeonPolioVaccinetoSeniorAdministrative
Medical Officers, 16 Aug. 1955.
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Polio Vaccine Innovation and Adoptionup and the United States vaccinated millions of children successfully with vaccine made
from the Mahoney strains in 1955 and 1956.
Eventually, in 1956, a new vaccination programme was planned with British IPV, made
from the Brunhilde strain, which was thought less aggressive than the Mahoney strain.
38
However, only small amounts of vaccine were available from the British manufacturer. In
MayandJune1956thevaccinewasadministeredtochildrenbetweentwoandnineyearsof
age, whose parents had to register them beforehand.
39 On the whole, 29 per cent of all
British children in that age group had been registered for vaccination, but only 10 per cent
of those registered, or 3 per cent of all children born between 1947 and 1956, could be
inoculated in 1956 with the specified two injections. The limited supplies available
extended no further than this.
Why did the British attitude, which had been so much in favour of the Salk vaccine,
change so quickly in 1955 and why were the risks so radically reassessed that for two years
imports of US vaccine were impossible? Consonant with Bryder’s findings regarding the
introduction of the BCG vaccine, historians connect the cautious attitude of the health
administrationinthecaseofpoliovaccineswiththelonghistoryofBritishanti-vaccination
movements and a general public distrust in vaccination.
40 However, this cautious attitude
must have been the outcome of a more complex relationship between health administra-
tion, pharmaceutical companies and users. An additional source of delay had to do with the
supply of vaccine. For spring 1957, Glaxo had promised to put a certain amount of vaccine
at the disposal of the health ministry, but there were again delays in production. In the
meantime, criticism of the Ministry of Health grew, with many articles in specialist
literature and in the press demanding the importation of American vaccine in order to
inoculate sufficient numbers of children. Growing public pressure for vaccination was a
main factor leading to a change of views in the Britishhealth administration. By mid-1957,
the 1955 decision not to import US vaccine with Mahoney strains because of the Cutter
accident was seen as outdated. In July 1957 the Medical Research Council revised its
position and recommended imports for 1958, though with the proviso that all imported
vaccine be submitted to extra tests in Britain.
41 Following this change of attitude in the
MRC, the cabinet now agreed to buy American and Canadian vaccine, and contracts were
made with the Canadian Connaught Laboratories and the US based Pitman-Moore
company.
42
Government hesitancy seems to have reflected not only concerns over safety. In the
Ministry of Health the question ‘‘If British supplies are adequate, should we buy only
38NA, PRO, MH 133/467, Joint Committee on
Poliomyelitis Vaccine Meeting, 10 Oct. 1955.
39‘Medical notes in Parliament: Poliomyelitis
vaccine’, Br. med. J., 1956, i: 299.
40C Webster, The health services since the war.
Vol. 2: Government and health care: the National
Health Service 1958–1979, London, The Stationary
Office, 1996, pp. 27, 128–9; A Hardy, ‘Poliomyelitis
and the neurologists: the view from England, 1896–
1966’,Bull.Hist.Med.,1997,71:249–72;fortheanti-
vaccination movements in Britain, see N Durbach,
Bodily matters: the anti-vaccination movement in
England 1853–1907, Durham, NC, Duke University
Press, 2005, and for post-1945 development,
especially pp. 200–7.
41NA, PRO, MH 55/2462, County Councils
Associationto EnidRussel-Smith,MinistryofHealth,
Sept. 1957. For the public discussion,see articleswith
headings as ‘‘Three shots needed’’ or ‘‘We’re
7,000,000jabsshort,yetthereisplentyofSalkvaccine
in the US and Canada’’ in the Daily Express, the Star
and other British newspapers during the winter of
1957/58.
42Report of the Chief Medical Officer on the state
of public health, 1957, PP 1958–59, XV, pp. 85–6.
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Ulrike Lindner and Stuart S BlumeBritish?’’ was discussed repeatedly in November and December 1958. Although Canadian
and American products were much cheaper (£107 to £117 per litre compared with £125 to
£175 for vaccine made by British companies) and should therefore have been attractive to
the NHS with its chronic shortage of funds, other criteria could clearly override cost
considerations. These were partly to do with safety. The MRC still saw British vaccine
as the safest (without giving any sound medical reasons), but the ‘‘natural desire to use
British rather than foreign products’’, as stressed in the British ministry, clearly involved
more than this.
43 For 1958 the Ministry of Health agreed to administer vaccine to all
children under fifteen. In order to meet this goal the imported vaccine would be used,
provided it hadundergonean additionalBritish test.Furthermore, parents shouldbe able to
choose, and would have the right to refuse to allow their children to be inoculated with
imported vaccine. This complicated scheme added to the relatively slow progress of
vaccination in the UK.
44
Oncesufficientquantitiesofvaccinewereavailable,vaccinationproceededsmoothly.In
contrast to West Germany and comparably with the Netherlands, the co-ordination and
organization of vaccination was good in the centrally organized National Health Service.
The Ministry of Health started centrally organized publicity campaigns: easy to arrange in
a centralized health service (in contrast to that in West Germany).
45 Vaccination was
organized and carried out by the Local Health Authorities (LHAs).
46 With their central
organization they could be easily informed about new developments by the Ministry of
Health. Medical Officers of Health and other personnel of the LHAs took over the inocu-
lation programmes; occasionally GPs collaborated. Like all treatment and preventive
measures, vaccination was free under the NHS. That the LHAs were accepted and trusted
by the public as places offering preventive services helped acceptance of the vaccine.
In Britain, problems and delays cannot be attributed to weak organization of the public
health system. They had more to do with the cautious attitudes of the health authorities and
problems in ensuring the necessary supply of vaccine. In any event, imported supplies
finallyallowedforextensionofthevaccinationprogrammein1958.Bythe endoftheyear,
6.4 million people had had two inoculations
47 and the number of polio cases declined
rapidly thereafter. By 1960 the low incidence of disease could be taken as showing the
efficiency of the IPV vaccination programme in Britain (see Figure 1).
Responses to the Live Virus Vaccines in the 1960s
Inthemid-1950sAlbertSabinattheUniversityofCincinnatiandHaroldCoxandHilary
Koprowski (both at that time with the pharmaceutical company Lederle), who had never
believed in the killed vaccine, were working on attenuated polio vaccines. By 1956, large-
scale trials of attenuated vaccines were being planned. These couldnot be held in the USA.
Widespread use of the Salk vaccine meant that most children already had antibody levels
43NA, PRO, MH 55/2464, Poliomyelitis
Vaccine–Ordering Policy, 1958.
44NA, PRO, MH 55/2462, Enid Russel-Smith,
Ministry of Health to Mr Dacey, County Councils
Association, 27 Sept. 1957.
45NA,PRO,MH55/2212,HealdtoDodds,15Oct.
1958.
46NA, PRO, MH 55/2469, Memorandum on
Poliomyelitis Vaccine, 9 May 1960.
47Report of the Chief Medical Officer on the state
of public health, 1958, PP 1959–60, XVI, p. 82.
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Polio Vaccine Innovation and Adoptionthat were too high for a different vaccine to be tested. At the invitation of George Dick,
professor of microbiology in Belfast, a first trial of Koprowski’s vaccine was organized in
Northern Ireland, followed by one in the Belgian Congo.
Albert Sabin, himself of Russian birth, succeeded in having his vaccine tested on a huge
scale in the Soviet Union: nearly 15 million people had swallowed his vaccine by July
1960.
48 The American authorities, unwilling to be once more rushed into licensing (as they
felt they had been with the Salk vaccine), were concerned by the possibility of the
attenuated virus vaccine reverting to virulence. Joseph Melnick, professor of virology
and epidemiology at Baylor University, was asked to conduct a comparative study of the
Sabin and Cox vaccines. Melnick’s results clearly favoured the Sabin strains over those of
Lederle-Cox.
49
In August 1960, the US Surgeon-General announced that he would recommend licen-
sing the Sabin vaccine, despite the protests of the National Foundation for Infantile
Paralysis to the effect that the efficacy of the Salk vaccine had not yet been fully estab-
lished. On the same day, ‘‘Lederle made it known that it had contracted to manufacture
Sabin vaccine’’.
50 The vaccine was, in fact, licensed on a strain-by-strain basis: in August
1961PfizerwasgrantedalicencetoproduceandmarketaTypeIvaccine,TypeIIfollowed
in October, and Type III in March 1962. A trivalent vaccine, including all three types,
became available in 1963. The stage was set for protracted discussion of the relative merits
of the Salk and Sabin vaccines.
At the beginning of the 1960s a clear professional consensus in favour of OPV emerged.
OPV was believed to confer longer-lasting protection, to be more acceptable to the public,
quicker acting, and to provide indirect protection to those not vaccinated through excretion





the arguments more complex.
51
Itwas graduallyacknowledged that,inasmallbutunknownpercentage ofcases, thelive
poliovirusinOPV reverted tovirulence. Studies inthe USAhadfoundthatasmallnumber
of polio cases had been caused by the vaccine itself. This was not the failure of one
company’s production process, as had occurred with IPV some years before. It was a risk
inherent in use of the vaccine. Choosing between one vaccine or the other now entailed
balancing relative benefits against relative risks: the presumed greater benefits of OPV
48‘‘Though no one questioned the overall
success of Sabin’s mission in Russia, it was, as
Smorodintsev belatedly admitted during a visit to
theUnitedStatesin 1964‘apublic-healthmeasurenot
a field trial’. Sabin’s live vaccine was never subjected
to the kind of rigorous field trial that Salk’s killed
vaccine had undergone in 1954’’, Gould, op. cit.,
note 36 above, p. 183.
49J L Melnick and J C Brennan, ‘Monkey
neurovirulence of attenuated poliovirus vaccines
being used in field trials’, in Live poliovirus vaccines,
First International Conference on Live Poliovirus
Vaccines, Scientific Publication, No. 44, Washington
DC, PAHO, Pan American Sanitary Bureau, 1959,
pp. 65–101.
50A E Klein, Trial by fury: the polio vaccine
controversy, New York, Charles Scribner’s
Sons, 1972, p. 147.
51This discussion is based on S Blume, ‘Lock
in, the state, and vaccine development: lessons from
the history of the polio vaccines’, Research Policy,
2005, 34: 159–73.
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Ulrike Lindner and Stuart S Blume(greater acceptability, community protection and so on) against the small but definite risks
associated with its use. Were the risks acceptable, and should society take them? Posed in
this way, the issue was a political one in a very fundamental sense. Perceptions might well
depend on how successful reduction in the incidence of polio with IPV had been and—
perhaps still more importantly—what still needed to be accomplished.
With the licensing of OPV, discussion began anew in the three countries, though with
very different results.
OPV in the Netherlands
Opinion was divided in the polio committee of the Dutch Health Council. In 1960–61 no
one arguedthat Salk vaccine shouldbe replaced by Sabin vaccine, but some believedthat a
store of Sabin vaccine should be available for use in the event of an epidemic. In 1962 this
became government policy: Sabin vaccine could be imported for use in an emergency.
Discussion regarding basic vaccination continued unabated. In late 1962 the polio com-
mittee once more reported to the Minister, recommending that Salk vaccine remain the
basis of the programme. This time J H de Haas, professor of paediatrics, submitted a
minority report in which he argued that OPV was more effective and that it was not
advisable for the Netherlands to continue with IPV when virtually all countries had
switched to OPV. In response, it was pointed out by the Chairman of the Health Council
thattherewasnoquestionof‘‘isolation’’:Australia,Canada,Denmark,SwedenandFrance
also continued to use IPV wholly or in part. In 1963 the Minister decided that the policy
wouldremainunchanged.Largelyduetoreligiousobjectionstovaccination,thenumberof
polio cases remained around 30 per year in some strongly Protestant communities. Given
the advantages of passive immunity that the Sabin vaccine was believed to confer, and the
possibility that there would be less objection to an oral (non-injected) vaccine, speculation
continued as to whether the Sabin vaccine should be given to all children. In a 1964 report
the polio committee was divided. In early 1965, however, it had reached a new consensus.
Adducing two principal arguments, the committee now stated that there was no longer any
reason for considering possible booster use of the Sabin vaccine. First, circulation of the
virus had been substantially reduced, and probably permanently so. And second, they
referred to evidence presented at the European Conference on Polio, held in Warsaw in
1964, that had emphasized the risks of the live vaccine. Despite questions from parlia-
mentarians from time to time,
52 and suggestions that the interests of the single national
producer had played too great a role, the Netherlands continued exclusively to use IPV
produced by the RIV, reserving imported OPV for emergency use in the event of an
epidemic.
OPV in Germany
The introduction of live polio vaccine in West Germany was far from auspicious.
Provoked by the beginnings of vaccination with Sabin vaccine in East Germany in
April 1960, West Berlin (legally in a position to act independently of the West German
52Maas, op. cit., note 18 above, pp. 119–28.
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Polio Vaccine Innovation and Adoptiongovernment) began vaccination with live vaccine in May of the same year. The arguments
were, with hindsight, curious ones. Berlin was still an open city in 1960. The health
authorities feared, for example, that vaccinated people from East Berlin would infect
people from the western part of the city. They even declared that it was necessary ‘‘to
build up a wall against the vaccine virus by generating immunity in West Berlin’’.
53 When
the American company Lederle offered the city Cox live vaccine for free, the Berlin
authorities accepted. 290,000 people were vaccinated from 11 May onwards.
54 However,
the vaccine proved to be too dangerous: forty-eight cases of polio ensued, and three people
died. The vaccination programme was stopped. Despite this experience, in 1961 the
Federal German government decided to initiate a national programme of vaccination
using OPV—the Sabin vaccine.
Further developments in West Germany are interesting in a number of respects. First of
all, public discussion remained again relatively muted. The grave consequences in Berlin
did not lead to a public outcry in Germany or to a wide discussion in the press. Even after
thecasesofpoliorelatedtothevaccinationprogrammewerepubliclyknown,Berlinhealth
officials mainly stressed the fact that Berlin had fewer polio cases than the rest of West
Germany and that the vaccination programme had to be seen as a success. The city’s
newspaper commentary was largely favourable.
55 When the circumstances of the Berlin
incidents were reported at the Fifth International Polio Conference in Copenhagen in July
1960, German press coverage remained quite neutral.
56 In the national scientific commu-
nity mistrust ofpolio vaccination was abating.Even after the incidentsin West Berlinwere
known, the scientific debate seemed to be in favour of the live vaccine. The clinical
advantages of OPV were stressed in the arguments of the health officials: the easy applica-
tion, the possibility of an easy mass vaccination and the lower costs.
57 Reports of success-
ful mass vaccination campaigns in the Eastern bloc presented at the 1960 International
Polio Conference also added to the favourable image of the live vaccine. Concern at the
risks of the new vaccine, which were evidently higher than the risks of IPV, did not
dominate the scientific discourse as much as it had when IPV was introduced.
The interests of the German vaccine industry were not a crucial factor in the change of
vaccination policy. Behringwerke had a clear commercial interest in promoting further
their existing IPV vaccine and in intensifying IPV vaccination. This is not what happened.
The company obviously had little influence on further decisions of the state administration
in favour of OPV vaccine, as the first vaccination programme started with only imported
OPV. For the first years of OPV vaccination the domestic manufacturer could not produce
sufficient vaccine for West Germany.
53BAK, B 142/3677, Sitzung der
Arbeitsgemeinschaft der leitenden Medizinalbeamten
der L€ a ander, 7 April 1960, in Saarbr€ u ucken.
54See several articles in Berlin newspapers, for
example, ‘Auch Affen trinken Impf-Cocktail’,
Berliner Morgenpost, 6 May 1960; ‘Aktion gegen
Kinderl€ a ahmung beginnt’, Der Tagesspiegel, 10 May
1960.
55See ‘Seit dem 10. Juli kein neuer Polio-Fall’,
Der Tagesspiegel, 30 July 1960; ‘Beginnende
Polio-Epidemie zum Stehen gebracht’,
Der Tagesspiegel, 2 Aug. 1960.
56There are no articles covering this incident in
June or July 1960 in newspapers and journals
throughout West Germany, such as the Frankfurter
AllgemeineZeitung, Die Zeit, and Der Spiegel. In July
1960 there were some articles reporting from the
Copenhagen Conference, where German scientists
referred to the incidents in Berlin, see Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung, 29 July 1960, no. 175.
57BAK, B 142/3527, Niederschrift € u uber die
Sitzung des Ausschusses 2 (Seuchenbek€ a ampfung und
Hygiene) des Bundesgesundheitsrates, 28/29
Sept. 1961.
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Ulrike Lindner and Stuart S BlumeThe German state and its health system changed vaccination policy quickly. Despite the
grave problems in Berlin and the higher risks of OPV, the federal health administration
decided to introduce vaccination with Sabin live vaccine in West Germany in 1961.
58 An
important reason for this decision was international pressure: the GDR had successfully
and without serious incidents introduced mass vaccination with Sabin vaccine in 1960 and
had vaccinated almost the whole populationin the meantime.Thecompetition between the
two German states and Cold War politics brought West Germany to act quickly.
59 Political
and ideological arguments for OPV were now crucial. Moreover, these Cold War con-
siderations coincided with growing international pressure. The poor position of West
Germany in regard to IPV vaccination was by now a source of growing embarrassment
for West German scientists and health officials.
60 As a consequence, the national attitude
towards new vaccine developments had already started to change. All in all, international
influence seems to have overcome national inhibitions. What followed was a change not
only in discourse, but in strategies.
The most striking change occurred in the organization of vaccination. Vaccination with
live vaccine posed the possibility of contact infections of third persons. As this meant a
potential violation of a person’s integrity (guaranteed in the federal constitution), vaccina-
tion could not be initiated without legal provision. The federal state did not have the
jurisdiction to pass such a law.
61 In the case of OPV, the L€ a ander, which had previously
acted so slowly and cautiously, now issued laws immediately and started vaccination
quickly. This time vaccination was organized via the public health administration only,
and it was free.
62 In the case of IPV most of the L€ a ander had charged the users. Now the
L€ a ander paid enormous sums for the imported vaccine, because Behringwerke could not
immediately produce enough OPV in 1962.
63
The vaccination was an immediate success; 23 million people were vaccinated in 1962,
the polio rates declining rapidly.
64 In the case of the L€ a ander major incentives for change
were not only the rivalry with the East but also the rivalries among the L€ a ander themselves.
Every single L€ a ander government was now obviously keen to be successful with vaccina-
tion at last and did not want to be a latecomer in this crucial development. In the case of
OPV, slowly changing national attitudes were confronted by sudden political pressure due
to Cold War politics resulting in a rapid revision of German vaccination policies. The
changed international environment played a major role in the introduction of OPV.
58BAK, B 142/3527, Niederschrift € u uber die
Sitzung des Ausschusses 2 des Bundes-
gesundheitsrates, 28/29 Sept. 1961, in Bonn.
59See the meeting of the leading health officers of
the West German L€ a ander when the GDR had started
mass vaccination: BAK, B 142/3677,
Sitzung der Arbeitsgemeinschaft der leitenden
Medizinalbeamten der L€ a ander, April 1960.
60See report of the West German delegate at the
European Polio Symposium in 1961: BAK, B 142/23,
Bericht f€ u ur das Innenministerium, VII. Europ€ a aisches
Poliomyelitis Symposion, in Oxford, Sept. 1961.
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Senatoren, 20.12.1961 in Bonn; W P Kierski,
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4: 97–105.
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Stenographische Berichte, 4. Wahlperiode, 12 April
1962, p. 1069.
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Polio Vaccine Innovation and AdoptionOPV in the UK
IntheUK,asinWest Germany,OPV hada badstart.Themicrobiologist George Dickhad
tested Koprowski’s live vaccine in Northern Ireland in 1956. His small trials had disastrous
results, showing Koprowski’s vaccine to be highly virulent. From then on Dick, who had a
highstandingintheBritishscientificcommunity,wasastrongcriticofthelivevirusprinciple.
It is no wonder that the Joint Committee on Poliomyelitis Vaccine generally rejected the new
OPV vaccine in 1959.
65 The committee members mainly feared that the virus would revert
to virulence in the human body and would pose a risk to non-vaccinated third persons.
The risks of the live vaccine dominated the scientific discussion in Britain until 1960.
From mid-1960 onwards, however, the discussion changed. Some months later than in
West Germany, OPV came to be seen as a possible alternative. For British participants too,
discussions at the Fifth International Polio Conference in Copenhagen in July 1960 played
their part.
66 Like the Dutch and in contrast to the Germans, the British had a working IPV
programme and polio incidence was already declining rapidly. But compared to the
Netherlands, which had rejected OPV, the clinical advantages of the new Sabin vaccine
received much more emphasis in British discussions.
An important consideration seems to have been the American decision regarding the
new vaccine. British health officials waited on reactions in the US:
Until last week the United States have had an exceedingly conservative approach to the use of
Sabin vaccine on a large scale. However, the Surgeon General of the United States Public Health
Service announced on 24
th Aug. 1960 that his organization was prepared to licence the commercial
production of Sabin vaccine as from April 1961 which meant that it would be available for use in
the autumn of 1961 ...I got in touch with the Surgeon General immediately for further information
and am awaiting his reply.
67
In the meantime, the UK continued using the inactivated vaccine in 1961. By the end of
that year 16.7 million people had received two shots, and 12 million had had three.
68 Sabin
vaccine should be used only in case of epidemics, the Ministry of Health advised all LHAs
in April 1961.
69
When such an emergency occurred soon afterwards, attitudes changed dramatically. In
September 1961 a serious outbreak of polio occurred in Hull. Very quickly the number of
infected people in the hospitals rose. As the inactivated vaccine was not able to halt the
epidemic,theHullHealthAuthorityaskedtheMinistry ofHealth’spermissiontouseOPV.
The Ministry agreed immediately, as it had the necessary supplies for such emergencies.
Within a few days in mid-October, 385,000 people were vaccinated in Hull and the
surrounding towns. By the end of the month the epidemic was under control. After
this success, the Sabin vaccine became widely accepted in the UK. Even harsh critics
ofthelivevaccine,suchasGeorgeDick,werenowconvinced.
70Atthesametime,theJoint
65NA, PRO, MH 133/468, Joint Committee on
Poliomyelitis Vaccine, 14 Oct. 1959.
66Fifth International Poliomyelitis Conference,
July 26–28, 1960, Copenhagen. Abstracts of papers
presented, Amsterdam, 1960.
67NA, PRO, MH 55/2469, ‘On live poliomyelitis
vaccine’, note by J A Charles, Sept. 1960.
68NA,PRO,MH55/2469,DraftonPolioVaccine,
9 May 1960.
69NA, PRO, MH 55/2469, Polio Vaccination
Programme, 15 Aug. 1960.
70NA, PRO, MH 55/2473, Ministry of Health
to Commonwealth Department of Health, Australia,
25Oct.1961;Gould,op.cit.,note36above,pp.175–6.
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Ulrike Lindner and Stuart S BlumeCommittee on Poliomyelitis Vaccine developed guidelines for the further use of OPV:
Sabin vaccine should be used for primary immunizations, courses of immunization which
had started with inactivated vaccine should be concluded with IPV. On 24 October 1961
the Minister of Health announced the general introduction of oral vaccination with Sabin
vaccine as an alternative form of polio vaccination.
71
The Ministry prepared for the large-scale introduction of Sabin vaccine in early 1962,
though not in the form of a blanket operation, i.e. a vaccination of the whole population, as
hadbeen done invery successfullyinthe Czech RepublicandinWestGermany.
72Socially
and politically the ground was prepared. In Parliament the Minister of Health made an
announcement about OPV on 31 January 1962. The medical journals had been informed
beforehand, and the Royal Society for the Promotion of Health invited Albert Sabin to give
a speechon the same day. A circular was sent to all Local Health Authorities about the new
vaccine. A press release sent to the main newspapers compared the introduction of the live
vaccine with the introduction of the smallpox vaccination and explained the reasons forthe
change of vaccine.
73
Following the launch of this public campaign, OPV was used everywhere in the UK for
primaryimmunizationofchildrenandteenagers.InApril1962theMinistryofHealthruled
that people who had already had a first shot of Salk vaccine could complete their immu-
nization with Sabin vaccine.
74 With this measure the changeover to Sabin vaccine was
complete.
Conclusions
In summary, the facts we have presented are as follows. In the Netherlands IPV was
introduced quickly and successfully, and no change to OPV took place later. In Britain the
fairly successful introduction of IPV was delayed for two years, whilst there then followed
a gradual, relatively slow change to use of OPV. In West Germany IPV vaccination was
introduced very late and with very poor results. Here the change to OPV took place early
and mass vaccination with this vaccine followed rapidly. As in Bryder’s account of BCG
introduction, the three countries show three completely different processes of vaccine
introduction and use.
The first question, then, is why did the introduction of IPV proceed so differently in
Germany, the Netherlands and the UK? All three countries were faced with serious annual
polio epidemics. The number of cases per 100,000 population in 1955, when IPV became
available, were 5.4, 4.5 and 14.1 (in England and Wales) respectively. Differences in
national responses cannot be sought here.
Hollingsworth and his colleagues explore the consequences of different patterns of
health service organization and finance (among other variables).
75 Their hypothesis is
71NA, PRO, MH 55/2473, Poliomyelitis,
Use of Live Oral Vaccine, 12 Oct. 1961;
Report of the Chief Medical Officer on the
state of public health, 1961, PP 1962–63,
XIX, p. 47.
72NA, PRO, MH 133/474, Joint Committee on
Poliomyelitis Vaccine, Minutes of Meeting,
23 Nov. 1962.
73NA, PRO, MH 55/2473, Sabin Polio Vaccine,
24 Jan. 1962.
74NA,PRO,MH55/2473,Circular,26April1962;
NA, PRO, MH 55/2474, CMO to GPs, Routine
Immunisation against Infectious Diseases,
9 March 1962.
75Hollingsworth, Hage and Hanneman,
op. cit., note 11 above, pp. 112–37.
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Polio Vaccine Innovation and Adoptionthat a high degree of state centralization in a health system should lead to relatively slow
adoption followed by rapid diffusion. Comparing the speed with which smallpox vaccina-
tionspreadinBritain,France,SwedenandtheUS,inthelatenineteenthandearlytwentieth
centuries, they find support for their hypothesis. In the case of polio, vaccination with IPV
would be expected to spread far more rapidly in the Netherlands and in the UK than in
Germany. The Netherlands introduced a nationally planned and co-ordinated vaccination
programme in 1957, precisely in order to ensure consistency and efficiency, whilst in
Britain a centrally planned and administered National Health Service was already in place.
Germany, by contrast, had a statutory health insurance scheme but a weak and fragmented
public health system. Comparing the Netherlands with Germany, the hypothesis is borne
out. But it fails to explain why diffusion of IPV in Britain was not as rapid as in the
NetherlandsdespitethecentralizedNHS.Additionalexplanatoryfactorshavetobesought.
The adequacy and responsiveness of vaccine supply to the needs of vaccination pro-
grammes could be one such factor. Innovation theorists have frequently stressed the
importance of producer-user relations to successful innovation.
76 Each country looked
to national producers: commercial producers in Germany and the UK, a state producer in
the Netherlands. As we saw, British and German suppliers had difficulties in producing
rapidlyvaccineofanadequatequalityandinthenecessaryquantities.Thiswasnotthecase
in the Netherlands: admittedly a smaller country. The Dutch state institute, closely linked
to the national vaccination programme, and with responsibility for meeting the pro-
gramme’s needs, was far more successful in producing the vaccine required than the
private companies in the UK and in West Germany.
In addition to differences in the structural features of health systems and in the relations
between vaccine production and public health systems, national attitudes to vaccination
and to the vaccine also played a part. In Germany the mistrustful attitudes of health
administrators and the scepticism of leading scientists clearly contributed to the hesitant
response to IPV. Despite strong connections with US research institutions and early
enthusiasm about the Salk vaccine, British health administrators were wary of US vaccine
after the Cutter incident and thereafter acted cautiously.
When we consider responses to OPV after 1960, Hollingsworth’s model proves still less
adequate. The degree of centralized control over health services cannot explain the non-
diffusion of OPV in the Netherlands, gradual diffusion in the UK, and rapid diffusion in
West Germany.
The concept of path dependencies, borrowed from Rothman (and related, as noted
above, to similar concepts used by innovation theorists) is more helpful in making
sense of these differences. In the Netherlands strong national path dependencies had
beencreated.Thestateinstitute(RIV)haddevelopedacombinationvaccine(incorporating
IPV) and a vaccine production process specifically tailored to the country’s vaccination
requirements. Marketing possibilities outside the country’s borders played no role. On the
one hand the RIV was an influential insider in vaccine policy making; on the other, the
Dutch Ministry of Health was in a position to orchestrate not only vaccination, but vaccine
76RRNelsonandSGWinter,‘Insearchofauseful
theory of innovation’, Research Policy, 1977, 6:
36–76.
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Ulrike Lindner and Stuart S Blumedevelopment and production as well. The programme had been highly effective, both in
terms of coverage and in terms of disease incidence. With an effective programme of IPV
vaccination, the Netherlands had rapidly brought polio under control. Thus in 1960 not
only did morbidity statistics provide no important incentive to change, but investments
madeinIPVproduction, andthe linkbetweenproductionanduse,can allbeseen ashaving
provided disincentivestochange overtoOPV.Thefact thatothercountrieswere switching
en masse to OPV carried little weight in Dutch deliberations.
In Germany in 1960 matters were quite different. IPV had reached only a very small
percentage of the population and there were still more than 4,000 cases of acute polio per
annum.Thecountry’sfailure tobringpolioundercontrolwasasourceofgrowingconcern,
though not in the sense that the statistics ‘‘spoke for themselves’’. A major impetus to
change derived from the international environment of the Cold War era. Significant for
West German policy makers was the competition with the GDR, and they paid careful
attention to what had been accomplished there. The logic of our argument implies that
stronginstitutionalcommitmentscouldhaveledpolicymakerstoplacethemostfavourable
gloss possible on available statistics, thus down-playing the failure of existing pro-
grammes. However this was not the case. No strong path dependencies of this kind
had been created. Links between vaccination programmes and vaccine production were
far weaker in Germany than in the Netherlands. The manufacturer, Behringwerke, was not
tiedtothehealthauthoritiesinthewaythattheRIVwas.Itmaybesurmised thatevenifthe
company did try to protect its investments in IPV technology, it would have been less
influential than the RIV in the Netherlands.
TurningfinallytotheUK,wefindasituationmidwaybetweenthoseofGermanyandthe
Netherlands. Only after delays and struggles did the British IPV vaccination programme
reach the necessary percentage of the population, morbidity rates declining from 1959
onwards.ButaninitialcommitmenttoIPVdidnotgiverisetothesamepathdependencyas
in the Netherlands for reasons similar to those given earlier. Commitment to IPV was
shakenbytheeffectivedeploymentofOPVinfightingthealarmingHullepidemicin1961.
The commercial manufacturer was not following the vaccination programme but was
making its own decisions on a commercial basis. Glaxo started to produce OPV even
before the British had decided to introduce it. And finally, the international environment
played a part. There was a strong connection to the US scientific community and health
administration. When the US changed to OPV the British were inclined to follow.
This comparative analysis of vaccine innovation and adoption leads to conclusions that
overlap with, but extend, the findings of Stanton and of Bryder. First, in common with
those authors—and in sharp contrast with much contemporary health policy analysis—we
conclude that scientific and epidemiological data did not ‘‘determine’’ the introduction of
the polio vaccines. Differences in the introduction of IPV far outweighed differences in the
burden of disease in each of the three countries. Epidemiological data, and studies of the
(relative) merits of the two vaccines, lent themselves to differing interpretations. They
could be, and were, read in different ways. Structural features of health systems, central
both to Stanton’s analysis and to Hollingsworth’s model, also played an important, though
not determining, role in explaining national differences. Moreover, and in line with much
currentinnovationtheory,wesuggestthatdifferentresponsestotheemergenceofthepolio
vaccines have to be understood also in terms of differences in linkage between national
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77 How directly are the needs of
vaccination programmes translated into priorities for vaccine manufacturers? The concept
of a national system of innovation, as a broad conceptual framework allowing for the
inclusion of institutional, organizational, social and political factors as well as economic
ones, seems potentially useful as a means of capturing this.
78
Bryder’s analysis stresses the importance of established traditions and professional
commitments in shaping responses to the emergence of BCG. We found something similar
here. Where existing ways of combating polio could plausibly be viewed as successful,
there was little incentive to change: developments could be subsumed under the notion of
path dependency as we suggested earlier. But here too the epidemiological evidence could
be interpreted in different ways, and is not in itself sufficient to explain action or inaction.
How data were interpreted depended on general attitudes of national scientific commu-
nities and the public, and on institutional commitments. The extent of institutional com-
mitment to IPV in both production and use
79 was a crucial source of this path dependency.
In addition to all this, and not noted by previous authors, our analysis has suggested the
varied and changing influence of international relations, shaped in this case by the Cold
War. A question for further research, and one highly relevant to the broader question of
historically changing dynamics of vaccine innovation, is that of how international stan-




for medical history, and medical historical research has enriched understanding of innova-
tion processes.
81 Unlike most other innovation studies, when looking at medical innova-
tions and their diffusion in different countries, as we do in this paper, the context—the
specific health system with its historically changing organization, culture, and cost
constraints—has to be taken into account.
82 We are convinced that comparative historical
analysis such as we have attempted here can enrich not only the field of innovation studies,
but substantive policy debates such as now take place in the vaccine field.
77C Edquist, ‘Innovation policy – a systemic
approach’, in D Archibugi and B-A ˚ Lundvall (eds),
The globalizing learning economy, Oxford University
Press, 2001, pp. 219–38.
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organizations, London and Washington, Pinter, 1997,
p. 17; R Nelson and K Nelson, ‘Technology,
institutionsandinnovationsystems’,ResearchPolicy,
2002, 31: 265–72, and their broad definition of
institutionsas‘‘widelyemployedsocialtechnologies’’
in their understanding of systems of innovation.
79Or more generally what David calls ‘‘lock in’’
andThomasHughes‘‘technologicalmomentum’’.See
David, op. cit., note 15 above, and T P Hughes, ‘The
evolution of large technological systems’, in
W E Bijker, T P Hughes and T J Pinch (eds),
The social construction of technological systems,
Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1987, pp. 51–82.
80We can distinguish effects due to international
standards, economic pressures (reflecting, for
example, growing concentration in the vaccines
industry), and political pressures (e.g., the rivalry
between countries, the growing importance of
global forums in seeking to structure global
vaccination efforts and vaccine development).
81For example, J V Pickstone (ed.), Medical
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